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Abstract
Background: Current occupational and public health guidance does not distinguish between rendering plant
workers and cullers/poultry workers in terms of infection risk in their respective roles during highly pathogenic
avian influenza poultry outbreaks. We describe an operational approach to human health risk assessment decision
making at a large rendering plant processing poultry carcasses stemming from two separate highly pathogenic
avian influenza A (H5N1) outbreaks in England during 2007.
Methods: During the first incident a uniform approach assigned equal exposure risk to all rendering workers in or
near the production line. A task based exposure assessment approach was adopted during the second incident
based on a hierarchy of occupational activities and potential for infection exposure. Workers assessed as being at
risk of infection were offered personal protective equipment; pre-exposure antiviral prophylaxis; seasonal influenza
immunisation; hygiene advice; and health monitoring. A repeat survey design was employed to compare the two
risk assessment approaches, with allocation of antiviral prophylaxis as the main outcome variable.
Results: Task based exposure assessment during the second incident reduced the number of workers assessed at
risk of infection from 72 to 55 (24% reduction) when compared to the first incident. No cases of influenza like
illness were reported in workers during both incidents.
Conclusions: Task based exposure assessment informs a proportionate public health response in rendering plant
workers during highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks, and reduces reliance on extensive antiviral
prophylaxis.
Background
Avian Influenza outbreaks on commercial poultry farms
have recently been identified in several European coun-
tries including the United Kingdom (UK) [1-4]. The
public health response to these incidents is based on
guidance tailored to the poultry industry. Pre-exposure
antiviral prophylaxis serves as an important intervention
even though there is limited evidence of additional ben-
efit above that provided by physical measures (masks,
gowns, gloves and handwashing) in reducing the spread
of respiratory viruses [5]. Additional public health mea-
sures include personal protective equipment, seasonal
influenza vaccines (aimed at preventing viral re-assort-
ment during co-infection) and health monitoring of the
affected population [6,7]. The main occupational groups
covered by this guidance include poultry workers, cul-
lers and others who have close or direct contact with
infected live poultry and their environment during cul-
ling operations [8].
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 out-
breaks require extensive culling of infected birds yield-
ing high numbers of carcasses to be safely disposed of
at industrial animal tissue rendering plants - the pre-
f e r r e dm e t h o do fd i s p o s a li nt h eU n i t e dK i n g d o m[ 9 ] .
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any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Rendering is a process that converts waste animal tissue
into stable materials like tallow and protein meal. Ren-
dering plant workers are not exposed to live infected
p o u l t r ya n dl i k e l yt ob ea tl o w e rr i s ko fH P A IH 5 N 1
infection compared to commercial poultry workers and
those involved in culling operations (catching, killing,
and evisceration of birds). There is some transmission
risk in rendering workers because influenza viruses sur-
vive for some days in carcasses, body fluids and some
contaminated surfaces [10,11]. The transportation of
infected carcases for off-farm rendering has been impli-
cated in avian influenza transmission between commer-
cial poultry farms [12]. However, in contrast to highly
exposed poultry workers and cullers, to date there have
been no reports of HPAI infection in rendering plant
workers [13,14].
Workers at rendering plants are not specifically cov-
ered by the existing health protection guidance for poul-
try workers, thus requiring context-specific human
health risk assessments during rendering operations
involving HPAI infected carcasses [6,8,15].
In order to inform future public health practice and
targeted prophylactic antiviral prescribing, we describe
our experience in refining the exposure risk assessment
for workers at an industrial rendering plant processing
infected poultry carcasses following culling operations
during two HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Suffolk, England
in February and November 2007 [3,4]. These incidents
resulted in approximately 160,000 carcasses being ren-
dered in February 2007 (Incident I) and 100,000 in
November 2007 (Incident II) [3,4].
Methods
Study population
The rendering plant is situated in the West Midlands
(180 miles from the affected farms in Suffolk), and
employs a constant workforce complement of 135 shift
workers delivering a 24 hour operation. Two of five pro-
duction lines are dedicated to processing infected animal
tissue. The main occupational categories are administra-
tion, production management, road (long distance)
transport drivers, on-site shunter drivers, raw material
operatives, general maintenance staff, and electricians.
During both incidents 22 animal health officers were
drafted in to supervise the rendering process giving an
overall plant workforce complement of 157.
Long distance truck drivers transported infected car-
casses in sealed trailers from the outbreak sites to the
rendering plant entrance, but did not participate in
loading or unloading carcasses. On-site shunter drivers
transport the full trailers to the start of the rendering
production lines where the carcasses are mechanically
unloaded directly into hoppers. Raw material operatives
manually scoop up any spillage (carcasses and tissues)
and the shunter drivers then wash down the trailers and
reception area using high pressure water jets. The ensu-
ing production process is automated and involves crush-
ing the carcasses, followed by high temperature heating
(steam cooker), and finally the separation of residue into
sterile fat (tallow) and solids (meat and bone meal). It
requires constant oversight by raw material operatives
and if repairs are needed, the production process is
halted and general maintenance personnel or electri-
cians undertake repairs which may involve working in
confined spaces contaminated with raw material.
Human health risk assessment
During both incidents, the local health protection unit
used direct observation to assess the potential for
worker exposure to infection and advised on prevention
measures prior to exposure. Our approach to human
health risk assessment was adapted and refined over the
two incidents. A “uniform” exposure risk assessment
used during incident I was replaced by a “targeted” task
based exposure assessment method during incident II.
During incident I the health protection team had only
a few hours advanced notice before delivery of the first
consignment of poultry carcasses to the plant. For logis-
tical reasons, a uniform “infected premises” risk assess-
ment approach was adopted with clearly defined
movement restriction zones similar to that used at the
poultry farm outbreak sites [16]. The restriction zones
on the plant premises included the road used to trans-
port carcasses and the two production lines. All staff
entering restriction zones (irrespective of their occupa-
tional category) were assessed as having uniform expo-
sure risk without considering differences in individual
occupational functions or tasks.
During incident II our prior experience informed the
development of a task based exposure assessment.
Work processes were studied by direct observation
and categorised into risk levels based on actual or
potential exposure to infected carcasses and contami-
nated surfaces. Four occupational risk categories (A to
D) were identified and interventions tailored accord-
i n g l y( T a b l e1 ) .
Protective interventions
Rendering workers assessed to be at risk of infection expo-
sure during the two incidents were offered pre-exposure
antiviral prophylaxis (oseltamivir 75 mg per day for mini-
mum of 10 days). The rendering of infected carcasses
lasted on average 5 days and based on individual worker
shift patterns, prophylaxis was extended for 7 days after
last exposure. The allocation of antiviral prophylaxis there-
fore serves as a proxy measure for workers assessed as
being at risk of infection. At risk workers were also offered
seasonal influenza immunisation (if unvaccinated);
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face piece protection level 3 (FFP3) respirator masks, eye
goggles, splash proof overalls, gloves, boots, and hard hats
- according to health and safety recommendations);
instruction on hygiene measures and hand washing; and
asked to report influenza-like illness symptoms to their
general practitioner for up to two weeks after last expo-
sure [6,8,15]. In addition, the study team wrote to the gen-
eral practitioners of all workers asking them to report by
telephone any cases of influenza-like illness during this
period.
Study design and analysis
We undertook a repeat descriptive survey comparing
worker risk assessment approaches across the two inci-
dents. Workers consented to participation and confiden-
tial records were kept by the plant management. During
both incidents, records were kept of the entire work-
force detailing their occupational category, exposure risk
categorisation, and subsequent allocation of antiviral
prophylaxis as the main outcome variable. Data on allo-
cation of seasonal influenza vaccination was also col-
lected. The analysed data is presented as counts and
proportions by occupational risk category, and absolute
differences between proportions in the two incidents
with no statistical test undertaken to determine the sig-
nificance of the difference between the observed
proportions.
Ethics approval
Not required.
Results
During both incidents all workers assessed as having
potential for infection exposure accepted antiviral
prophylaxis. No workers were exposed to infectious
material prior to receiving antiviral prophylaxis. The
number of workers assessed as being at risk of infection
(offered antiviral drugs) decreased from 72 (46%) during
incident I to 55 (35%) during incident II. This reduction
is apparent in occupational risk groups A, B, and D
(Table 2). In occupational risk group C, the proportion
allocated antiviral prophylaxis increased during incident
II with an absolute difference of 17% between incidents
(Table 2).
During incident I, 60 (83%) at-risk workers accepted
seasonal influenza immunisation; 4 (5%) had prior
immunisation; and 8 (11%) declined immunisation. Dur-
ing incident II, 45 (81%) at risk workers accepted seaso-
nal influenza immunisation with the remainder
declining or having had prior immunisation. No cases of
influenza-like illness were reported to general practi-
tioners in the two weeks following last potential expo-
sure in both incidents.
Discussion
The use of a task based exposure assessment approach
during incident II resulted in 17 (24%) fewer workers
categorised as being at risk and prescribed oseltamivir
prophylaxis. This approach allowed the exclusion of a
significant number of workers in the very low risk cate-
gory D group (particularly long distance truck drivers
and administrative staff) and limiting the number in
high risk categories (A & B). Due to a communication
error, seven category D workers did receive antiviral
p r o p h y l a x i s( b u tn o tP P E )a tt h eo n s e to fi n c i d e n tI I .
The increase in the proportion of category C workers
receiving the interventions (including antiviral prophy-
laxis and PPE) during incident II is due to a precaution-
ary increase in supervisory staff (duty and production
Table 1 Risk categories and recommended preventive interventions in rendering plant workers potentially exposed to
H5N1 infected poultry carcasses as applied during Incident II
Risk
Group
Exposure category Intervention provided Occupational group
A. High
risk
Direct contact - handling infected raw material
Droplet or aerosol -
contact with infected liquids or aerosol
generated by high pressure water clearing
within confined space
PPE, antiviral prophylaxis (oseltamivir), seasonal
influenza vaccine
Raw material operatives; shunter
drivers;
B. Medium
risk
Indirect contact - handling/touching
contaminated surfaces; work in confined
production line spaces
General maintenance personnel
C. Low risk Working in close proximity (within 1 metre) to
infected dead poultry (but no exposure as
described above)
PPE, seasonal influenza vaccine, with/without
antiviral prophylaxis (based on individual
assessment of exposure risk)
Production managers; general
manager; electricians; duty manager;
animal health officers
D.
Negligible
risk
Not sharing the same confined space with
infected dead poultry, and no direct, indirect,
droplet or aerosol contact
None Managerial staff; administrative staff;
long distance truck drivers
PPE (personal protective equipment): filter face piece, protection level 3 (FFP3) respirator masks, eye goggles, splash proof overalls, gloves, boots, and hard hats.
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in workers requiring seasonal influenza vaccine during
incident II is only in part due to task based exposure
assessment, as some would have had prior
immunisation.
The findings from an exposure risk assessment of car-
cass disposal options appears to suggest that exposure
to and the risk of H1N1 infection is likely to be low in
the latter stages of the carcass disposal process such as
during the rendering of killed poultry[17].
However, specific guidance on risk assessment and
management of rendering workers is not available and
related guidance is conflicting. For example, the Eur-
opean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control gui-
dance classifies rendering workers under the “direct
contact” group [18]. Occupational health and safety gui-
dance in Northern Ireland excludes rendering workers
from the at-risk group as they are judged not to have
“direct contact with sick, dead or dying infected birds or
bird products” [19]. The existing Health Protection
Agency guidance also does not specifically cover render-
ing workers and the application of the guidance to this
population is open to interpretation [5]. In addition, in
the UK, rendering plant workers are specifically excluded
from guidance recommending annual pre-exposure sea-
sonal influenza immunisation of poultry workers [20].
Although the uniform risk assessment approach (using
the “infected premises” principle) adopted in “Incident
I” can be implemented rapidly and easily enforced, it
lacks the specificity required when advising anxious
workers on the need for antiviral prophylaxis. The uni-
form approach clearly has merits during culling opera-
tions on poultry farms with large numbers of temporary
workers drafted in at short notice. By contrast, the con-
trolled rendering plant environment is well suited to a
task based exposure assessment approach due to the
clear demarcation of work areas, operational processes
and associated occupational functions. Adopting task
based worker exposure assessment prior to HPAI out-
breaks has application to all types of poultry industry
w o r k e r sa sam e a n st oe n s u r i n gar i s kb a s e da n dp r o -
portionate response to such situations.
The safety and efficacy of neuraminidase inhibitors
has already been demonstrated extensively in studies of
adults taking chemoprophylaxis following exposure to
the seasonal influenza virus [21,22]. However, there is a
paucity of research evidence on the safety and efficacy
of these agents against H5N1 particularly when used for
short and longer-term prophylaxis particularly in low-
risk occupational groups [23]. Although we did not
m o n i t o rc o m p l i a n c ea n dm e a s u r et h ei n c i d e n c eo f
adverse events in our study population, it is possible
that minor adverse events went undetected.
This study proposes improvements in the risk assess-
ment methodology based on an understanding of the
occupational and industrial process and was not
designed to estimate the actual level of infection risk in
rendering workers. The total absence of reported influ-
enza like illness in workers up to 14 days after exposure
to the rendering process, despite adopting a task based
exposure assessment approach, is encouraging. Although
it is possible that very mild cases may not have been
detected, we have no reason to believe there was under-
ascertainment of influenza like illness cases by general
practitioners serving this workforce. A definitive evalua-
tion of the potential for avian-to-human transmission of
H5N1 in rendering workers would necessitate undertak-
ing a cohort study comparing paired serum samples in
all occupational categories over both incidents. Although
there is evidence of potential for transmission in poultry
workers and cullers, their exposure risk is significantly
higher than rendering workers [13,14]. This study also
does not measure the added benefit of antiviral prophy-
laxis in comparison to barrier methods in preventing
infection.
Even though the full workforce complement (by cate-
gory and person-hours worked) at the plant remained
largely unchanged, there were seasonal workers
employed during the two incidents. This means that we
cannot fully assume that the study population represents
paired groups with observations taken from the same
individuals during the two incidents, an assumption that
is required to undertake appropriate statistical tests such
as a McNemars test. We would have analysed the sub-
Table 2 Administration of pre-exposure antiviral prophylaxis by occupational risk category comparing different risk
assessment approaches used in incident I and incident II
Occupational risk group Total worker population At risk population in receipt of intervention Absolute difference
N Incident I Incident II P2 - P1
n % (P1) n % (P2)
A (high risk) 37 17 46 15 41 -5
B (medium risk) 17 12 71 9 53 -18
C (low risk) 35 18 51 24 69 17
D (negligible risk) 68 25 37 7 10 -26
TOTAL 157 72 46 55 35 -11
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heterogeneous nature of the study population (paired
and unpaired) precluded our ability to link the observa-
tions recorded during the two incidents to specific indi-
viduals so as to identify discordant pairs.
The perception that the risk of infection and transmis-
sion is uniformly low in rendering workers has not been
validated, particularly in terms of the higher risk occu-
pational categories. Work to measure task based H5N1
exposure risk and biological outcomes (measures of
infection and seroconversion) should be undertaken in
future.
Conclusions
The use of a task based exposure assessment approach
was practical to implement and has relevance for the
protection of all workers involved in rendering HPAI
infected poultry carcasses. Evidence based guidance that
focuses on the highest risk occupational groups will
help contain costs, and limit the extent of reliance on
antiviral prophylaxis. In addition, this may have benefits
in reducing the risk of adverse events and the develop-
ment of drug resistance.
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